

**Kuki Evaluation 2007-2008  
Final Report**

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**Executive Summary**

**Background:** The methodology for the 2006-2007 Kuki evaluation asked: *Does Kuki affect opinions and behaviors of Rwandan elites, and Does participation in the Kuki debates enhance Kuki's impact?* We studied elites from the four regions of Rwanda, including the capital Kigali, using a randomized experimental design. One group of elites was asked to refrain from listening to Kuki for one year, another was invited to listen to Kuki for one year, and the third group was invited to listen and also to attend one of LaBenevolencija's public debates. By comparing survey responses between the three different groups, we were able to examine the impact of listening to Kuki as well as participation in an important component of this project, the Kuki debates.

**Findings:** This evaluation found that listening to Kuki and debating Kuki did not have significant effects on elite opinion about the continuum of violence or other messages from the Kuki program. One year of programming may not be enough to change opinion. Our results indicate which Kuki messages are in line with current elite opinion, and which messages go against popular opinion among Rwandan elites at this time. This information will be helpful for future programming.

In contrast to opinion, listening and debating **Kuki changed important behaviors among elites with respect to dialogue and social inclusion.** Specifically we find that the Kuki debates were responsible for encouraging more discussions with family and friend about the Kuki messages, an important vehicle for social change. Moreover, we find that listening to Kuki and participating in Kuki debates caused elites to be more inclusive when inviting community members to a future public dialogue. Specifically, Kuki listeners and those who attended debates were more likely to invite people who are not in their family circle to a public dialogue on reconciliation and trauma healing. A willingness to engage with the broader community on the sensitive topics of reconciliation and trauma healing should be considered a significant outcome for a radio program, particularly one that targets the opinion leaders of Rwandan communities.

**Research leaders in the field: Justin Rwibasira & Albert Badouin Twizeyimana**

### *I. Overall questions:*

The Kuki evaluation is designed to answer two questions:

1. Does Kuki affect opinions (beliefs and attitudes) and behaviors of Rwandan elites?
2. Does participation in the Kuki debates enhance the impact of Kuki on Rwandan elites?

### *II. Participants and evaluation sites*

To answer these questions, the evaluation team measured knowledge, attitudes, and behavior among three types of Rwandan elites:

- Elites who did not listen to Kuki
- Elites who did listen to Kuki
- Elites who listened to Kuki and who attended debates organized by LaBenevolencija about the Kuki messages.

Because the participants in this study did not *choose their own evaluation group*, and because they were assigned to their group *at random*, we will be able to conclude at the end of the study that any observed differences between the groups were *caused* by listening to Kuki, by participating in the Kuki debates, or both. This methodology is known as a randomized experiment.

We selected 60 elites in the four main regions and in Kigali, for a total of five sites and approximately 300 participants:

- Kigali
- East region--Rwamagana
- North region—Byumba ville
- West region—Kibuye ville
- South region—Butare ville

To select these elites, LaBenevolencija-employed facilitators originating from each region compiled a list of elites who come from one of the following categories:

- Priest / Nun / Minister / Other religious position
- Primary / Secondary / University teacher
- OLDER student : 18 or older
- Business person: small business, big business
- Local politician / Mayor all the way to a nyumbakumi
- Gacaca judge
- Other judges or lawyers
- Military or police
- Journalist

- NGO worker
- Civil society worker (work in another organization)
- A rich person
- Any other “notable” in the town (found by asking city-dwellers—“Qui sont les notables?”)

The idea was to choose the “opinion leaders” of each region, who have the potential to influence many people.

### *III. Measurement*

At the end of one year, all elite participants filled out the same post-test questionnaire.

The post-questionnaire measured participants’:

- *Agreement* with lessons about the continuum of violence
- *Agreement* with other messages in Kuki (regarding passivity, respect for authority, trauma, propaganda, commemoration, and the like)
- *Behavior* in their families and in their communities

### *IV. Results*

#### **Agreement with messages about the continuum of violence**

There were no differences among the three comparison groups with respect to their agreement with messages about the continuum of violence.

We found generally **high agreement** that the following factors contribute to mass violence or genocide:

- Exclusion of a group in the government
- Dehumanization or discrimination of certain people with discriminatory policies
- Destructive ideology
- Extremism
- Inter-group intolerance
- Injustice
- Negation of a group’s history, silence about a group’s history.
- Hate media
- Passive bystandership


*“High agreement” means 3.3—4 on a rating scale where 1= completely disagree, 2= disagree, 3= agree, and 4= completely agree.*

We found general **disagreement** that the following factors contribute to mass violence or genocide:

- Exclusion of certain groups from participating in (economic or social) associations
- Jokes, proverbs, or adages that make fun of another group
- Unhealed trauma or other psychological wounds
- Fear tied to a negative history (of cyclical violence, etc.)
- Indifference or contempt during commemoration of past violence.
- Excessive respect for authority
- False testimony
- Censorship or prevention of liberty of expression
- History of colonialization

*“Disagreement” means lower than 0.9 on a rating scale where 1= completely disagree, 2= disagree, 3= agree, and 4= completely agree.*

Figure 1: Agreement/disagreement with continuum messages.



*Note there are no significant differences between those who listened and did not listen to Kuki; the figure helps to illustrate that some messages are widely believed by Rwandan elites, and others may require more programming and discussion.*

### **Agreement with other messages in Kuki**

There were no differences between those who listened and did not listen to Kuki in terms of their agreement with the following messages.

#### *1. Elites agree: Citizens shouldn't have excessive respect for authority*

While it seems that elites did not seem to think that excessive respect for authority leads to mass violence or genocide, they did agree that citizens should moderate their deference to authority, in agreement with messages outside of the continuum of violence messages.

*2. Elites agree: Open dialogue*

2a. When a person has an ideology I don't know, I try to explain why we don't share the same views rather than saying why I'm better

2b. When I discuss with others about politics and history, I like speaking with people who don't necessarily share my point of view

Elites agreed with Kuki's messages about open dialogue—discussing ideas about politics, history, and ideology in an open manner and not closing off that dialogue to those who disagree with them. What is notable about this attitude is that only those who listened to Kuki and who listened and debated about Kuki actually *acted* on this attitude (see behavioral results).

*3. Elites agree: Equality*

3a. We should do what we can as intellectuals to fight inequality--inequality is not inevitable

3b. I try to help less educated people to help them have a voice and resist manipulations

3c. Everyone should have the same rights

Elites agreed with messages about equality and their responsibility to help those in less powerful or prosperous positions.

*4. Elites agree: Trauma*

4a. Traumatization does not just go away with time

4b. Traumatized people need material support to heal

Elites agreed with Kuki's messages about trauma healing, though they did not agree with the idea that healing is connected to commemoration (see below).

**Disagreement with Kuki messages**

Elites for the most part disagreed with (politically sensitive) messages regarding expression of ideas that are different from government ideas.

*Elites disagree:*

1. Government should not repress those who disagree

2. Different opinions about government in the media are good for the population because they show them ideas about existing problems

3. We shouldn't censor all that which does not follow the government line



4. Everyone should be able to say what they think even if it's different

Elites also thought that they were less influenced by propaganda than others (in opposition to one of Kuki's messages):

*Elites disagree: Even intellectuals are influenced by propaganda*


**Behaviors:***Media behaviors generally*

We find that the elites in our sample regularly listen to the radio, and nearly half of the sample watches television “all the time.”




*Discussing politics*

Elites report discussing politics more often with friends and family than with work colleagues. The majority (44%) discuss “sometimes”; approximately 40% rarely or never discuss politics.




Nearly half of all elites rarely or never discuss politics with work colleagues.



### *Discussing Kuki messages*

Our experimental design uncovered an important and powerful effect of the Kuki debates. Specifically, **those who were invited to debate were significantly more likely to discuss Kuki themes with friends and family**, compared to those who only listened to the radio program. Social discussion networks are powerful vehicles for spreading messages; this can be considered a substantial success for the debate program.



We did not observe any differences for discussing politics in general with friends and family for the three different experimental groups (i.e. “does not listen,” “listens,” and “listens and debates.”)

### **Behavioral impact:**


#### Including others from the community in a public dialogue on reconciliation and trauma healing

At the end of our questionnaire, we explained to our sample of elites that LaBenevolencija is considering the possibility of holding another public debate about reconciliation and trauma healing in their community. Elites were asked to nominate people who could be involved in this event—anyone they wanted.

We were interested to know whom elites would invite. Would they invite their family only, or would they broaden the circle to include their colleagues and neighbors?

From their nominations (we asked elites to identify the people whom they nominated), we discovered the following:

**Participating in Kuki debates causes elites to include more people in future public dialogues about reconciliation and trauma healing.**



### **Conclusion:**

This evaluation found that listening to Kuki and debating Kuki did not have significant effects on elite opinion about the continuum of violence or other messages from the Kuki program. One year of programming may not be enough to change opinion. Our results indicate which Kuki messages are in line with current elite opinion, and which messages go against popular opinion among Rwandan elites at this time. This information will be helpful for future programming.

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Recommendations: On the basis of this recommendation, **we recommend that the debates continue as part of the Kuki communication strategy.** We find that the debates are powerful vehicles for spreading Kuki messages, both formally (at the debate venue) and informally (in the homes and neighborhoods of participants following the debate).

With respect to the messages, we find that there is not a great deal of opinion change toward agreement with all Kuki messages. We recommend that Kuki designers re-examine the messages that are not currently “popular” with elites. It may be that elites are not ready to discuss such issues at this time (e.g., because of political sensitivities), but it also may be the case that they do not feel that some messages reflect their reality. It might be useful to conduct some focus groups with willing elites to discuss in some more depth their opinions about certain messages and their “fit” with the Rwandese context. It may also be the case that some messages did not receive enough attention in the first year of the new Kuki format, and that future Kukis should focus more on these issues (for example, trauma and commemoration).